Ecological restoration and economic recovery in Kazakhstan’s Northern Aral Sea region


Kristopher D. White, Ph.D., KIMEP University
Philip Micklin, Ph.D., Western Michigan University
DOI: 10.21690/foge/2021.64.4f

Recent popular press headlines talk of a returning or revived Aral Sea (see eg. Locke, 2017 or Jennings 2018). This might understandably lead readers to assume that the great terminal lake, once the world’s 4th largest in surface area and over the past five decades site of among the world’s most notorious anthropogenic ecological disasters, is in fact coming back. An examination of regional satellite imagery, however, even just over the past two decades, shows a drastically shrinking lake and a region-wide ongoing desertification process (Figure 1). Clearly the Aral Sea, in its pre-desiccation form, is not returning anytime soon. However, recent developments on Kazakhstan’s Northern Aral Sea (NAS) – namely the 2005 completion of the 13 km Kok-Aral dam and dike complex southwest of the Syrdarya river delta – have resulted in improvements in the region’s ecological and economic conditions. This paper sets out to describe recent (and partial) recovery in ecological and economic terms within the Northern Aral Sea region. Following a brief review of the Aral Sea crisis, we will then review attempts at human intervention to stabilize the NAS. Partial ecological recovery will be briefly discussed, as will recent economic improvements largely stemming from the modest return of fish species and the fishing industry. These modest developments have resulted in a sense of hope and optimism among regional residents, a common refrain uncovered through fieldwork and interviews conducted during the authors’ numerous trips to the region since the dam’s completion. The paper concludes on a cautionary note, however, as the future of the NAS itself remains uncertain, as does the sustainability of its resources. Concern is raised here over the long-term effectiveness of current exploitation and management systems with respect to the lake’s fishery. Sustainability of this resource is vital for the region’s socio-economic future.

Figure 1. 21st Century Desiccation of the Aral Sea: 2000 and 2018*

The Aral Sea

What was once the Aral Sea was a brackish endorheic lake spanning the border region in W Kazakhstan and NW Uzbekistan. With a surface area of 67,500 km2 the Aral was, in 1960, the world’s fourth largest lake in surface area behind the Caspian Sea, Lake Superior, and Lake Victoria. With an average salinity of 10 g/l the Aral featured salt content roughly one third of the open ocean. Of course with a lake this size salinity did vary, with concentrations varying with distance from the deltas of the two feeder rivers, the Syrdarya emptying in the north, and Amudarya filling from the south. As a terminal lake, the Aral had no outflow and as a result salts and minerals flushed from the feeder river drainage basins produced slightly salty, brackish hydrologic conditions that would intensify as the lake began its recession and evaporation. The Aral ecosystem supported what has been described as ‘modest’ levels of biodiversity. A number of endemic fish species navigated the Aral’s waters (including the now extinct Aral salmon Salmo aralensis) and wetland habitats provided sanctuary for a host of migratory and resident bird populations. Deltaic reed environments were also once home to the now extinct Caspian tiger or Turan tiger (Panthera tigris virgata). Russian admiral A. Butakoff, surveying the Aral in 1848-9 encountered a number of these animals, with his soldiers killing many (see Butakoff, 1853).

A fishing industry developed on the Aral Sea by the early 20th century that included the harvest, processing, and extra-regional export of fish to other regions of the Soviet Union. One such notable case involved a request of Aral fishermen to provide fish for famine-stricken areas within Russia in 1921. The ‘Lenin Letter’ remains a source of local pride today and a mural depicting local fishermen loading 14 rail cars of fish is featured prominently in the Aralsk train station. At this time, across the entire Aral Sea, the fishery represented the region’s most important economic sector (Piancola, 2019). By the mid-20th century Aralsk, Kazakhstan and Muynaq, Uzbekistan had become important ports and entrepôt (break in bulk) locations between sea faring vessels and rail lines linked with much of the rest of the Soviet Union. Aralsk’s Aralrybprom fish processing center was a vital employer in the north, and Muynaq’s fish canning factory in the south was among the largest factories, of any kind, in the Soviet Union (Zonn, 2010). The peak of fish harvests on the Aral Sea occurred around 1957, with 48,000 tons of fish caught (Micklin, 1988).

The Aral Sea crisis

The receding Aral Sea and resulting disastrous consequences for ecological and socio economic conditions have received ample scholarly attention. (see e.g. Micklin, 1988). Geographers, of course, are particularly cognizant of this case. A wide range of textbooks in our discipline (world regional, human, physical) invariably include an image of the iconic sea-going vessel stranded in the desert, left to rust and decay by the evaporating Aral. The US space agency NASA (2021) in particular showcases a multi-year visual demonstration of the Aral Sea’s near disappearance since 2000, showing the outline of the Aral in 1960. Figure 1 shows the Aral Sea in 2000 (left image) and 2018 (right image). The dramatic change over just the past two decades is visually evident. Satellite images have been extremely useful in tracking and measuring physical and environmental changes in the lake’s character and will prove even more so in the future. As for the rusting ships, today many of these iconic vessels have themselves disappeared, having been harvested for scrap metal which is ultimately exported to China (Figure 2 and 3).

The Aral Sea crisis is also a notorious example of Geography’s human environment tradition. Human action, in the form of Soviet and continuing post-Soviet unsustainable water withdrawals from the Amudarya and Syrdarya ultimately proved disastrous for the Aral Sea. Concrete and steel dams, sluices, and river diversion infrastructure were connected with an extensive network of inefficient irrigation canals initially conceived (and incredibly later scaled down) as part of what Soviet geographer Andrei A. Grigoryev (1883-1968) termed the “Stalin plan for remodeling nature” (1952, p. 170). This transformative human intervention was constructed to anchor a greatly expanding cotton production sector in Central Asia. Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan remain global leaders in cotton growing, harvest, and export today. Perhaps most dramatic of the irrigation canal infrastructure was the Karakum canal in Turkmenistan, completed in 1955 and traversing the Karakum (translates into ‘black sands’ from Turkic languages of Central Asia) desert nearly to the Caspian Sea. These human actions ultimately tipped the Aral’s water balance to deficit conditions and the evaporating Aral, described accurately as among the world’s worst anthropogenic environmental disasters, accelerated and continues to this day.

Figure 2: Dismantling an Aral Sea fishing vessel, 2007. Photo by Phil Micklin.

Figure 3: Transporting scrap metal from former harbor of Aralsk, 2008. Photo by Kristopher White.

In addition to the region’s biophysical environment, these anthropogenic actions proved disastrous for the region’s socio-economic conditions as well. As the Aral Sea has evaporated, mineralized and chemical-laden sediments have blanketed the region, the newly desiccated landscape now referred to as Aralkum (Aral sands in Turkic languages of Central Asia), a desert having replaced what was once one of the world’s greatest lakes. Remnant compounds from agricultural chemicals (including herbicides, pesticides, and defoliants) have also accumulated through the region. Human inhabitants face exposure to these salts and chemical compounds via the food and water supply as well as through the air they breathe. Dust and sandstorms (see RFE/RL 2018 for a recent dramatic instance) continue to afflict the region today. Impacts on human health (a range of cancers, anemia, as well as respiratory and circulatory diseases) have proved disastrous, amplified by widespread unemployment and poverty conditions. The Aral’s near-disappearance and highly elevated levels of salinity led to the collapse of what was previously a vibrant fishing industry.

By the late 1980s the evaporating Aral had split into two water bodies. The much larger of these was a southern portion extending into Kazakhstan though mostly in Uzbekistan’s nominally autonomous region of Karakalpakistan, and fed primarily by the Amudarya. Over time the Amu (darya means river in the Turkic languages of Central Asia) only periodically reaches the southern Aral, a product of upstream water withdrawals. The much smaller Northern Aral Sea, located entirely within Kazakhstan, is fed by the Syrdarya and became separated from the southern part of the Aral by the dried Berg Strait. Since their split in 1989, these two water bodies have remained distinct and as such the Aral Sea has not existed as a single physical geographical entity since that time. The diverging environmental and socio-economic prospects of these lakes and their regions have been well articulated (see e.g. Glantz, 2007 or Izhitskiy et al., 2016)

Human intervention on the Northern Aral Sea

By the early 1990s it had become apparent to scientists studying the Aral (perhaps most notably Dr. Nokolai Aladin, an aquatic zoologist with Russia’s Zoological Institute, Russian Academy of Sciences in St. Petersburg) that some form of retaining structure across Berg’s Strait might prevent the possibility of the Syrdarya from eroding south (eventually robbing the NAS of its source of fresh water) and might also improve the ecological situation of the NAS. It was thought that more freshwater inflow from the Syrdarya could be retained, effectively lowering salinity levels and perhaps saving aquatic habitats for the lakes biodiversity. In 1992, local residents completed construction of an earthen dike, constructed mostly of sand, across the strait. This structure washed away fairly quickly, and in 1996 another, more solidly built dike was erected in the same location. This second attempt proved more successful, though did lack any spillway to release water (and pressure) during spring periods of higher water volume. In April of 1999 NAS waters breached the dike, killing two workers and washing away 27 others, necessitating an emergency boat and helicopter rescue (Aladin et al., 2008). Though this second attempt to retain NAS water ended in tragedy, during its brief existence this dike had led to positive changes for the lake. Slight increases in NAS water area and volume translated into lowered salinity levels. Perhaps more importantly, it also proved that a structurally sound dike across Berg’s Strait, could, if equipped with proper spillway release, result in some stabilization of the NAS and its aquatic ecosystems.

The World Bank in the early 1990s in cooperation with the Aral Sea Basin governments formulated an Aral Sea Basin Assistance Program (ASBP) (Micklin 2014). Cost was estimated at 470 million USD and implementation period to be 15-20 years. The International Fund to Save the Aral Sea (IFAS) was created by the Bank and Aral Sea Basin countries to raise money to fund improvement activities and to coordinate programs. Bank hydrology and water management experts concluded that trying to restore the entire sea to its pre-1960 status would require more water than was going to be available in any realistic near-term scenario. However, partial restoration of the North Aral Sea was seen feasible and included it as one of the Phase 1 projects. In June of 2001, the World Bank and Kazakhstan government ratified what is officially known as the Syr Darya Control and Northern Aral Sea Phase 1 project. Completed in late summer of 2005, the nearly $86 million project ($64.5 million of which was financed by the World Bank) included the Kok-Aral dam and connected 13 km dike that has been widely celebrated for ‘saving’ the NAS. The Kok-Aral itself (Figure 4) measures approximately 200 m across and includes nine spillways allowing excess water to pass to the south during periods of high water and high inflow from the Syrdarya. In addition to the dam and dike, the project also included major re-channeling and concrete embankments stabilizing parts of the lower reaches of the Syrdarya, including another dam structure called the Aklak spillway. Further upstream, infrastructural improvements to the large Chardarya dam and reservoir have also been carried out, all resulting in improved flow conditions for the Syrdarya and stability of the freshwater deltaic lakes, a number of which are serving as hatcheries for fish and habitat for aquatic biodiversity.

Figure 4: Heavy flow of Syrdarya through Kok-Aral Dam on May 30, 2017. Spillway design capacity is 395 m3/s. Photo by Philip Micklin.

Ecological Restoration

The NAS reached the design height of the project (42 meters measured above the Kronstadt gage on the Baltic Sea near St. Petersburg, Russia) in March 2006, only six months after the gates were closed, which was much quicker than experts had predicted. There was only a 4.5 % rise in water level (from 40 to 42 meters) but it increased surface area by 18% (from 2804 to ~3300 km2 ). The lake’s average salinity dropped from 30 grams/liter to about 8 grams/liter, the latter amount slightly below what this part of the Aral featured in 1960. It should be noted here that average salinity masks variations in NAS salt content from nearly freshwater at the mouth of the Syrdarya to brackish concentrations at the northwest part of the NAS at Butakoff Bay (named after afore-mentioned Russian Admiral A. Butakoff). In all, increased retention of freshwater inflow and decreases in salinity have stimulated a recovery of biodiversity stocks in the NAS (Plotnikov et al., 2017) as well as in proximate wetland habitats (Figure 5). With expanded area of spawning habitat, this has also resulted in the return of many fish species. By the 21st century, the only remaining fish in the NAS was the introduced Black Sea Flounder (Platichthys flesus luscus), brought from the Sea of Azov. This salt tolerant fish could survive in the 30 gram/liter water whereas all other native species could not. These other fish either became extinct or sought refuge in lower salinities found in the deltaic lakes or lower reaches of the Syrdarya.

Today, an estimated 18 species of fish have returned to the NAS, including those most commercially harvested like carp (Cyprinus carpio aralensis), bream (Abramis brama orientalis), pike-perch (Stizostedion lucioperca), roach (Rutilus rutilus aralensis), asp (Aspius aspius iblioides), saberfish (Pelecus cultratus), and rudd (Scardinius crythropthalmus). The less commercially harvested returnees include pike (Esox lucius Linnacus), snakehead (Channa argus warpachowskii) and the very rare Aral barbell (Barbus brachycephalus brachycephalus) (Plotnikov et al., 2016).

Figure 5: Restored Northern Aral Sea wetland habitat, 2018. Photo by Kristopher White.

Wetland area restoration has included reed beds and grasses that provide protective cover for resident and migratory bird species (Figure 6), as well as sanctuary for smaller vegetation and invertebrate organisms on which the birds feed. Clearly the stabilization and expansion of the NAS has halted desertification in the immediate region, and the lake’s growth seems to have impacted local weather patterns, with residents reporting more precipitation and a return of climate moderating influences.

Figure 6: Male yellow wagtail (Motacilla flava) in restored Northern Aral Sea wetland habitat, 2018. Photo by Kristopher White.

Economic Recovery

Of the ecological improvements described above, arguably the best news for the region’s economy and socio-economic conditions has been the return of fish and a modest return of the fishing industry (harvest, processing, local retail sales, and export) that is once again serving as the region’s economic base. NAS fish harvests in 2005 totaled 695 metric tons, an amount largely composed of Black Sea flounder though with smaller amounts of carp, bream, and pike-perch. By 2016, total harvests had increased to 6,000 metric tons, an increase of 763% since the dam project’s completion. Commercially harvested species expanded as well, to include roach, asp, saberfish, and rudd. With the exception of flounder (harvest decreases for this specie are likely a result of the overall population declines associated with lower average NAS salinity levels) and carp (a less sought after fish as others have returned), each of the harvest totals for the individual fish species have increased dramatically over time, in particular bream, pike-perch, and roach. While each have contributed, the specie likely most responsible for the economic turnaround is the pike-perch, which fetches the highest price from the net, and is highly demanded elsewhere, particularly Europe. This represents an important source of export revenue for the NAS region. Estimates place the total number of fishermen on the NAS at more than 1,000.

Sharp increases in fish harvests have corresponded with an increase in the number of regional fish processing centers. At the time of the dam’s completion in 2005, one such processing center existed in the region, Aralsk’s Kambala Balyk (Russian kambala translates as flounder, Kazakh balyk translates as fish) factory. Today, at least 20 processing facilities exist across the NAS region, many are freezing and packing centers in very small, sandswept villages accessible only via worn, unpaved ‘roads’ through the desert (for example in Akespe or Tastubek).

Figure 7: Kambala Balyk fish factory worker with dried pike-perch necks, 2014. Photo by Kristopher White.

In Aralsk, the Kambala Balyk processing plant began operation in the early 2000s to process and freeze the lone commercial specie harvested at that time, the introduced Black Sea flounder. Today, the factory smokes, dries, and salts a number of fish species and produces vacuum packed dried fish snacks. Pike-perch fillets are also prepared here. Employment (Figure 7) has increased from 5 when it started operations to about 30 today. The Aral Fresh Fish Processing Plant opened in Aralsk in 2009. The large, modern-appearing glass building has become a showcase for the region’s recent economic recovery (Figure 8). Processing of pike-perch is done here, including fillets and ‘cheeks’ dried and/or salted and packaged as snacks (Figure 9). Employment has increased from 30 in 2009 to about 75 today. Also in Aralsk, the Aral Service Center factory began operating in 2010 on the grounds of the former Soviet Aralrybprom plant. It specializes in processing and freezing pike-perch fillets (Figure 10), and at present is the only facility in Aralsk officially licensed to export fish to the European Union. Employment here has increased from 12 in 2010 to about 30 today.

Figure 8: Aralsk, Kazakhstan bus stop signage featuring the Aral Fresh Fish Processing Center, 2017. Photo by Kristopher White.

Figure 9: Initial preparation of pike-perch ‘cheeks’ at the Aral Fresh Fish Processing Center, 2019. Photo by Kristopher White.

Figure 10: Preparation of pike-perch fillets, Aral Service Center, 2017. Photo by Kristopher White.

In addition to frozen pike-perch fillets from the Aral Service Center exported to the EU, each of the region’s processing centers do produce fish products bound for extra-regional export. In the case of Aralsk’s Aral Fresh Fish Processing Center and Kambala Balyk processed fish are exported to Russia, Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Turkey. Domestically, fish are shipped to Almaty (Kazakhstan’s largest city), Nur-sultan (the capital, formerly Astana), Aktobe, and Kyzylorda. In the case of a few smaller processing centers closer to the NAS (here we are referring to plants in the villages of Tastubek and Bogun), processed fish are frozen and exported to Russia.

Export revenue and income earned in the various fishing sectors (harvest, processing, and retail) has provided stimulus to the NAS regional economy. Income from fishing circulates and expands in the regional economy (multiplier effect) most clearly on the visual landscape in the construction and retail sectors. In the small fishing village of Tastubek, interviews with fishermen reveal that new housing construction here (Figure 11) has blossomed. Over the latter part of the past decade, the number of homes in Tastubek has increased from 15 to 30. Fishing income has also allowed fishermen to purchase new automobiles, new boats, new consumer goods (television sets and refrigerators in particular) and greatly improved their socio-economic situation. In Aralsk, recent new home construction is noticeable, as is a relatively dramatic expansion in the city’s retail sector. Late 2019 saw the construction and opening of a large, modern electronics retail establishment selling a wide variety of consumer goods, from large screen television sets to computers, home appliances, mobile phones, and cameras. Elsewhere in the city (and also very recent) a modern and well-lit 24 hour grocery store has opened, selling a wide range of produce and household goods. A number of new hotels have opened in Aralsk, and for long the city’s only hotel (the Soviet-era Hotel Aral) is currently (as of October 2019) closed and undergoing major modernization and renovation work.

Figure 11: New housing construction in Tastubek, Kazakhstan, 2017. Photo by Kristopher White.

Cautious Hope and Optimism

The ecological restoration and economic recovery briefly described above has been referred to by us as ‘partial’ (for the former see Micklin et al. (eds.) 2014, for the latter see White, 2016). Clearly the NAS is not what it was prior to 1960 nor is the size of the fishing sector. However, for this region, even marginal ecological and economic stabilization and improvements have sparked a sense of long-absent hope and optimism (Figure 12). These feelings have been expressed to us by many residents in many settlements throughout the region and without fail attributed to the success of the Kok-Aral dam and dike project. Some degree of hope stems from the planned (though currently stalled and far from certain) Phase 2 of the Syr Darya Control and Northern Aral Sea project. For most of the past decade, debate has ensued over which of two options policy makers will settle on. The first option is to heighten the existing dam and dike by six meters. The second is to build another dam across the southern strait forming Saryshaganak Bay and diverting additional waters from the Syrdarya to fill the bay and optimally bring water back to Aralsk harbor. This option would also require loch (lock) infrastructure to compensate for elevation differences between NAS and the bay, allowing fishing vessels to once again reach Aralsk. This second option of course would require more human intervention on the NAS, and more artificial ‘remodeling’ and control of nature, more environmental manipulation via concrete, steel, and additional river diversion.

Figure 12: I Love Aral, 2017. City toponym Aralsk in Russian language, Aral in Kazakh. Photo by Kristopher White.

An Uncertain Future

Uncertainty with respect to which direction the next phase of intervention will take exists, though each option is expected to yield positive outcomes for the NAS ecological situation and the region’s fishing sector and regional economy. The sustainability of the NAS fishery is of particular concern today. Some have identified poaching (harvesting out of season or disregarding minimum size limits for each specie) as a major problem (see Chen, 2018). Others express greater concern over the potential over-exploitation of the resource where poaching has an impact, though the current legal management regime may render the fishery unsustainable. The NAS is divided up into 18 rather arbitrarily-delimited fishing sectors, with each having its own fishing fleet and at least one affiliated processing center. As processing capacity has increased across the NAS region, so too has the pressure on the fishery resource. Such harvesting behavior is not atypical of other fisheries elsewhere, as short term economic gain has superseded long term resource sustainability. Under this scenario, it is highly likely that fish catches are underreported. Data from this part of the world are suspect as it is, and underreporting simply adds to the unreliability of harvest statistics. It is important, it would seem, for fishery managers to at the very least have accurate statistics to ensure the sustainability of the fishery.

Additional uncertainty results from the potential negative impacts of climate change on the source of freshwater for the NAS. Formed by the confluence of the Naryn and Karadarya rivers, the headwaters of the Syrdarya are nourished by the glaciers of northeastern Kyrgyzstan. Glacial retreat in the Tien Shan is of particular concern, calling into question the long-term viability of water supply. While melting might lead to short term increased flow, sustainability of this vital water source for the Syrdarya and, ultimately, the NAS is far from certain.

Conclusion

Examining fairly recent time series satellite imagery from the Aral Sea region shows clearly that the Aral Sea is not returning, a reality that seems to contradict a number of recent popular press headlines. The Kok-Aral dam, dike, and remainder of the World Bank’s Syr Darya Control and Northern Aral Sea Phase 1 project has successfully stabilized the Northern Aral Sea. Possible future Phase 2 changes will offer even more benefits. This relatively small lake’s slight (about 18%) expansion has resulted in partial ecological restoration and economic recovery within the region. The return of fish, in particular, is an important by product of the former and direct instigator of the latter. Ecological restoration has brought fish, which has brought regional economic stimulus, which has brought hope and optimism. We find it rather ironic that the human action largely responsible for the Aral crisis (artificial hydraulic infrastructure, dams, river diversion, more steel and concrete, essentially a ‘remodeling’ of nature) resembles that which is now credited with the stabilization, recovery, and revival of the NAS. With over a decade of positive news coming from Kazakhstan’s Northern Aral Sea region, it is hoped that present and future resource management is up to the task of ensuring the sustainability of the fishery. Continued ecological and economic improvements can build upon the current regional optimism, a much needed development in a region so long facing the brunt of the environmental and socio-economic repercussions of the Aral Sea crisis.

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