In 2024 a remarkable 1.45 billion people participated in international tourism (Statista 2024; WTTC 2025). As the world’s foremost service sector, international tourism exerts a profound influence on the global economy, accounting for over 10% of global GDP ($10.9 trillion) and employing 357 million people (approximately one in every ten workers) (WTTC 2025). Tourism is a significant source of foreign currency, contributes to national GDP, enhances infrastructure, and stimulates small business development through supply chains and multiplier effects (Brenner 2010; Chitadze 2023; Scott and Gossling 2015). With proper management, tourism can also help conserve biodiversity, protect cultural heritage, reduce poverty, and counter the negative effects of climate change (UNWTO 2023).
In highly developed countries like France, Spain, Italy, and the U.S., tourism brings in millions of dollars annually, but it also fuels congestion, cultural erosion, and housing crises. In some destinations such as Barcelona and Venice, tourism has become so intense and burdensome that it overwhelms the resident population (a phenomenon scholars refer to as overtourism) (Dodds and Butler 2019).
By comparison, in developing countries such as Egypt, India, Turkey, and Thailand, tourism continues to yield favorable returns. It boosts direct foreign investment, generates employment opportunities, and supports economic diversification. However, tourism in these regions is more volatile, shaped by shifting tourist preferences, global economic changes, political instability, and natural disasters.
Among developing nations, Mexico stands out as a notable success story for its government-led tourism strategy. In the 1960s, aside from a few cultural heritage sites and the beaches of Acapulco, Mexico attracted relatively few international visitors (Clancy 2001). Since then, federal initiatives have transformed Mexico into a global tourism powerhouse. Today, tourism stands as one of Mexico’s principal sources of foreign currency, alongside assembly manufacturing, remittances, and petroleum exports.
With the exception of a temporary decline during the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020-21, Mexico has consistently welcomed approximately 40 million international tourists annually, reaching 45.39 million in 2024 (SECTUR 2025). Of these visitors, 83% originated from the U.S. and 5% came from Canada (Statista 2025). Since 1995, it has regularly ranked among the top ten most visited countries in the world. In 2024, international tourism generated US$264 billion, accounted for 14.2% of Mexico’s GDP, and employed 7.56 million people (about 13% of the workforce) (WTTC 2025). These figures underscore the importance that international tourism plays in Mexico’s economic development.
Mexico’s tourism success is no accident. Since 1974, the federal government has actively developed international destinations, prioritizing high-quality visitor experiences (Altés 2008; Brenner 2010; Brenner and Aguilar 2002; Bringas-Rábago 2002; Clancy 2001; Osorio-García and Novo 2020; Pick et al. 2001; Torres and Momsen 2005; Wilson 2008). Although Mexico’s tourism sector has experienced sustained success, it has faced and overcome significant challenges along the way. Examining the past 65 years reveals four generations of government-backed, international tourist destinations in Mexico. This paper draws on various sources of information including economic trend analysis; a comprehensive review of existing literature; informal interviews with government officials, tourism professionals, and local guides; content analysis of promotional materials, government documents, and tourism websites; and more than 30 years of participant observation. The remainder of this article discusses the evolution of international tourist resorts in Mexico.
In 1924, the Mexican government took its first significant step in tourism development with the construction of the Autopista del Sol (“Highway to the Sun”) connecting Mexico City with the emerging seaside resort of Acapulco. Completed in 1927, the paved road reduced travel time from eight hours to just over three. The government’s twofold purpose was to ease pressure on Mexico City and to improve access to the coast. Prior to this, tourism in Mexico through the 1940s was largely unplanned and remained a neglected part of the national economy (Gladstone 2006; Wilson 2008). In these early years, proximity to the U.S. was the primary factor shaping international tourism in Mexico (Stronge and Redman 1982). During American Prohibition (1920–1933), for instance, U.S. citizens crossed the border to circumvent restrictions on alcohol (Arreola and Curtis 1993).
Following World War II, international tourism in Mexico entered a slow but protracted period of growth. With much of Europe devastated by war, Mexico aimed to position itself as an alternative destination for increasingly affluent Americans and Canadians (Clancy 2001; Nolan and Nolan 1988). Moreover, as U.S. and Cuba relations deteriorated in the early 1960s, Mexico’s popularity among American tourists began to surge.
With its abundant turquoise bays, sun-drenched beaches, rugged mountains that meet the sea, all set within a warm tropical climate, Mexico has many of the key ingredients needed to support international tourism. Yet, the country’s earliest foray into tourism unfolded more by happenstance than by design. Mexico’s first tourist destinations began as modest fishing villages situated in striking natural settings. Over time, Acapulco, Cozumel, Mazatlán, and Puerto Vallarta evolved into major tourism hubs.
Most began with small numbers of local or regional visitors drawn to the natural beauty and serenity. Tourism, however, held little appeal for nearby residents because fishing remained the backbone of the local economy. Gradually, word spread, sparking interest in tourism’s economic potential. Residents began offering basic services like eateries, lodging, and guided excursions. As the infrastructure improved, international tourism took root. Business interests soon recognized the profitability of tourism, and the economic base shifted from harvesting fish to hosting international travelers. Today, it is hard to imagine these bustling, urbanized centers were once quiet fishing villages.
Acapulco followed a similar path, but its rise was far more compressed, thanks largely to the city’s former mayor. As President, Miguel Alemán Valdés witnessed that international air travel was becoming increasingly widespread, yet his country was not keeping pace. He saw inadequate transportation as the main barrier to tourism growth. He directed federal funds toward new roads and airports and supported hotel development through government-backed loans. In 1947, actor Errol Flynn and Swiss musician Teddy Stauffer visited and were captivated by Acapulco’s bay. Stauffer soon invested in luxury hotels. By the early 1950s, Acapulco emerged as Mexico’s first international resort dependent on air travel (Turner and Ash 1975). The once-quiet town quickly turned into a glamorous hotspot for Hollywood stars like Cary Grant, Elizabeth Taylor, John Wayne, Elvis Presley, Marilyn Monroe, and the “Rat Pack” (Dean Martin, Frank Sinatra, Sammy Davis Jr.) (Losser 2023).
The opening of Las Brisas Hotel in 1957 further cemented Acapulco’s elite status. In just three decades, the city grew from a modest population of 10,000 in 1940, to over 174,000 residents by 1970 and welcomed 1.5 million tourists annually (INEGI 2020). The 1950s to 1970s marked Acapulco’s golden era; a time when it stood as the centerpiece of Mexico’s international tourism industry (Osorio-García and Novo 2020).
By the mid-1980s, many of Mexico’s former fishing villages had gained international recognition. What these first-generation resorts shared was a lack of coordinated planning. By the late 1970s, the consequences of unregulated and largely spontaneous tourism development had become increasingly apparent. Popular destinations like Acapulco, Cozumel, and Puerto Vallarta faced mounting pressures including pollution, deforestation, sewage problems, overcrowding, housing shortages, and rising crime (Avilez, Rivas, and Chavarria 2012; Gladstone 2006; Meyer-Arendt 2002; Parish Flannery 2014). In many ways, they had become victims of their own success.
Pollution in Acapulco became so severe that, by the early 1980s, beaches were closed and health warnings issued (Macdonald 1990; Nolan and Nolan 1988; Riding 1981). Acapulco came to symbolize failed tourism planning, giving rise to the term “Acapulco-ization” (Paterson 2008; Torres and Momsen 2005). But it wasn’t alone. A 2007 Greenpeace report found Puerto Vallarta had been discharging untreated wastewater into Banderas Bay for decades, leading to fecal bacteria levels sixteen times higher than WHO standards (Paterson 2008).
As the drawbacks of spontaneous tourism became clear, these resorts saw their reputations decline. To stay competitive, many reinvented themselves. With five main piers and service from more than 25 cruise lines, Cozumel has become one of the world’s premier cruise ship ports-of-call (TIC 2025). Acapulco has launched the most ambitious revitalization efforts. Since 1982, the federal government has invested in cleaning up the bay, upgrading infrastructure, and improving residents’ quality-of-life. Yet, the city still faces daunting challenges including recurring hurricane damage, political corruption, entrenched organized crime, and drug violence.
Today, millions still visit these first-generation resorts, but international traffic has plateaued or declined. While facelifts and marketing bring temporary boosts, chronic problems rooted in their spontaneous development continue to erode their long-term appeal. As early as the 1970s, the Mexican government realized these resorts were growing beyond control. In response, it shifted strategies, investing in a new generation of planned destinations. The goal was to design and create resorts that could be better managed for long-term viability and appeal.
During Prohibition and through the 1950s, most international visitors arrived in Mexico from the U.S. via ground transportation (Gladstone 2006). They typically headed to border towns where illicit activities were common. Tijuana, in particular, gained notoriety as a haven for navy sailors on leave seeking debaucherous activities. Concerned about Mexico’s deteriorating international reputation, the government took action.
In 1961, Banco de México launched PRONAF (Programa Nacional Fronterizo) to rehabilitate the seedy image of border towns (Arreola and Curtis 1993). Federal funding and financial incentives spurred beautification and renovation projects throughout the border region, with the lion’s share directed to key gateway cities such as Tijuana, Nogales, and Ciudad Juárez. This marked the first time that federal funds were used for tourism planning and development.
Galvanized by PRONAF’s success, Banco de México in 1968 released the results of a three-year study that recommended developing a series of new resort destinations supported by aggressive international marketing. The projected benefits included regional development, increased foreign revenue, and expanded employment opportunities (Brenner and Aguilar 2002; Casagrande 1987; Casison 2001). Coincidentally, the discovery of oil provided Mexico with the collateral necessary to secure international loans, which helped fund the ambitious tourism infrastructure projects (Clancy 2001).
On December 29, 1973, Mexico’s legislature approved the creation of FONATUR (Fondo Nacional de Fomento al Turismo), and within a year a new cabinet-level ministry with its own secretariat was fully operational. FONATUR was granted substantial federal funding and charged with a two-fold purpose of: 1) developing and managing the country’s coastal resorts, and 2) preventing the missteps and undesirable consequences seen in earlier destinations like Acapulco (Call 2001; Clancy 2001). Central to this initiative was the creation of enclave-style resorts known as Integrally Planned Centers (IPCs) (Brenner 2010; Osorio-Garcia and Novo 2020). The launch of FONATUR marked a turning point in Mexico’s international tourism industry, ushering in a new era of state-led tourism planning and development.
FONATUR was granted such sweeping authority that it often wielded more influence over infrastructure development, land-use planning, and tourism marketing than local governments. Backed by this broad mandate and leveraging the latest advances in computer modeling, FONATUR conducted a nationwide survey to pinpoint the ideal site for its first master-planned international mega-resort (Collins 1979; Gladstone 2006). The northeastern tip of the Yucatán Peninsula emerged as the optimal location.
Cancún
With an initial US$21.5 million loan from the Inter-American Development Bank, the Mexican government announced plans to build a new resort called Cancún (translated from Mayan as “Pot of Gold”) on a remote, uninhabited sandbar (Dunphy 1972; Meyer-Arendt 1987). This ambitious project marked the first time in global tourism history that a resort was constructed entirely from scratch (Murray 2007). From an aerial perspective, Cancún’s sandbar resembles the shape of a number “7” as it curves around Nichupté Lagoon. Originally detached from the mainland, the narrow strip of land was soon linked at both ends by causeways.
By late 1974, the first four hotels were completed, and Cancún opened its doors to international travelers. It was an immediate success. By 1986, it had surpassed Acapulco in international arrivals, solidifying its place as Mexico’s premier tourist resort (Clancy 2001; Gladstone 2006; Murray 2007; Nolan and Nolan 1988).
Every detail in Cancún was meticulously planned. The Mexican government even imported a water treatment system from the U.S. to ensure that visitors would feel comfortable drinking water directly from the tap (Collins 1979). Designed to be a model city, Cancún aimed to serve both tourists and residents (Gormsen 1982). The goal was to foster a stable, engaged workforce that would take pride in their jobs and enhance visitor experience (Dunphy 1972). FONATUR also assumed that international visitors would find added value in interacting with locals and learning about regional culture.
Between 1972 and 2000, Cancún grew from roughly 300 to 450,000 residents (INEGI 2000; Zaragoza and Rojas 2000). As the city evolved, cultural and economic shifts led to increasing social segregation. The original vision of a shared space for locals and tourists gave way to a divided landscape. Cancún’s main tourist zone became known among locals as “Gringolandia” (a space heavily influenced and shaped by transnational forces and mass tourism, particularly by American tourists) (Torres and Momsen 2005).
By the late 1990s, Cancún began to exhibit many of the same unattractive qualities that plagued Acapulco and other first generation resorts (Brenner 2010; Murray 2007; Osorio-Garcia and Novo 2020). Cancún no longer maintained the level of exclusivity originally envisioned by the government. Instead, its runaway success led to unchecked growth, and the city struggled to keep pace (Vargas Martínez et al. 2013). FONATUR responded by launching a major revitalization project, channeling significant funds into improving Cancún’s image and infrastructure. The government replaced or renovated outdated buildings, constructed a new marina, and developed fresh attractions to sustain the resort’s appeal.
Then, in October 2005, disaster struck when Hurricane Wilma battered Cancún, stalling over the city and hotel zone for nearly 48 hours. The storm caused more than US$2 billion in damage. Initially, FONATUR officials were devastated because Mexico stood to lose an estimated US$150 million per month in tourism revenue (Economist 2005). However, the disaster created a rare opportunity. The government poured over US$2 billion into reconstruction, modernizing infrastructure and refurbishing hotels. They spent an additional US$20 million to restore the lost sand and expand the beaches (Economist 2006). Underscoring Cancún’s vital importance to Mexico’s tourism economy, the revitalized resort reopened to foreign visitors just nine months later. By the summer of 2006 a stronger, more modern Cancún had emerged and was once again welcoming international tourists.
Cancún has undeniably become Mexico’s most successful international tourist destination and FONATUR’s flagship mega-resort. As of 2024, this world-class destination boasted 35,357 hotel rooms and maintained an impressive annual average occupancy rate of 82%. Even amid the COVID-19 pandemic’s disruptions, Cancún has averaged 7.3 million international visitors annually over the past decade. By itself, Cancún accounts for 64.5% of all international tourists traveling to Mexico (SECTUR 2025; TA 2025).
Cancún was the first of FONATUR’s five master-planned tourism “growth poles.” The others include Ixtapa, Los Cabos, Loreto, and Huatulco. Although several were conceived at roughly the same time as Cancún, the government intentionally staggered their development so as to incorporate lessons learned elsewhere (Gladstone 2006). This phased approach allowed FONATUR to refine its resorts over time, ensuring high standards, lasting appeal, and sustained economic vitality.
Ixtapa
Located 245 kilometers (150 miles) northwest of Acapulco, Ixtapa was developed to ease pressure on Acapulco, spread tourism across the state of Guerrero, and expand the Mexican Riviera (Brenner 1999). Playa Linda was considered an ideal location because of the area’s favorable topography and the absence of a preexisting coastal settlement. The biggest advantage was that just 11 kilometers (7 miles) from Ixtapa sat the town of Zihuatanejo, which could provide a reliable source of labor (Ixt-Zihua 2025). Because “Zihua” remained physically and socially separate, Ixtapa was able to develop as an exclusive, high-end resort (Reynoso y Valle 1979).
Ixtapa developed slowly. Its first high-rise hotel opened in 1976, but momentum did not build until the mid-1980s, when the World Bank issued a US$22 million loan for infrastructure improvement (Brenner 1999; Ixt-Zihua 2025; Nolan and Nolan 1988). The resort’s prestige and name recognition grew in 2001 when billionaire Carlos Slim built a beach house in Punta Ixtapa. Today, Ixtapa remains a polished, upper-tier tourist destination. With 3,600 hotel rooms and nearly 84,000 visitors annually, Ixtapa is FONATUR’s third most successful resort (SECTUR 2025).
Los Cabos
Historically home to a remote mission outpost and restocking station for Manila Galleons, in the 1960s the southern tip of Baja California became known as a premier destination for deep sea sport fishing (Ganster and Gámez 2012). American anglers got hooked catching trophy-sized marlin, tuna, and dorado. The opening of the Carretera Transpeninsular (Transpeninsular Highway) in 1973 combined with FONATUR’s formal involvement in 1976 marked the beginning of large-scale tourism development. With new roads, modern utilities, a harbor, and an international airport, Los Cabos rapidly transformed into Mexico’s most expensive and most internationally oriented resort (foreign visitors outnumber domestic travelers eight to one) (Gladstone 2006; Reynolds 1994). Today, Los Cabos attracts outdoor enthusiasts and luxury travelers. High hotel occupancy rates (around 80%) and well-developed infrastructure have made it FONATUR’s second most successful destination.
Loreto
Founded in 1697 to serve as the colonial capital of Baja California, Loreto was plagued by chronic aridity, extreme heat, geographic isolation, and devastating hurricanes. In 1829, the capital was moved to La Paz. In hindsight, FONATUR might have anticipated the challenges it would face. Nonetheless, in 1976, the agency began constructing its newest mega-resort targeting North American tourists who were seeking a more remote experience. Despite initial investments in hotels, a marina, and a golf course, Loreto struggled to grow due to its geographic isloation and lack of private investment. In 2003, the Trust for Sustainable Development (TSD), proposed transforming the resort into a retirement community emphasizing sustainability and environmental stewardship. The initiative failed to take root after TSD went bankrupt in 2007. That same year, Loreto was integrated into a broader tourism corridor (Loreto–Nopoló–Notrí–Puerto Escondido–Ligüi–Ensenada Blanca), but results remained modest (Torres 2007). In 2012, Loreto was named a Pueblo Mágico for its rich history, small-town charm, and vibrant marine ecosystem. Still, Loreto continues to underperform with low tourist numbers and a hotel occupancy rate hovering around 35% (Reynolds 1994). To date, Loreto remains FONATUR’s least successful master-planned resort.
Huatulco
After a ten-year hiatus (perhaps reflecting on the setbacks at Loreto), in 1984 FONATUR embarked on its most ambitious tourism mega-project. Acknowledging lessons learned from earlier resorts, Huatulco represented efforts to adopt a more socially responsible, economically sound, and environmentally sustainable development model (Brenner 2010). Built in a geographically isolated and inaccessible corner of Oaxaca, the project has been rife with problems. Federal expropriation of land triggered strong local resistance. The conflict erupted when FONATUR announced plans to relocate all 735 residents farther inland. Tensions escalated as new housing restrictions were imposed and waves of outside construction workers arrived, straining local traditions and resources. Resentment deepened when most mid- and upper-level tourism jobs went to outsiders. Huatulco came to be known as FONATUR’s most controversial tourism development project (Pick et al. 2001).
Huatulco’s master plan called for nine scenic bays, but the resort that hugs the Oaxacan coastline today covers only three bays; the rest were converted into a national park suitable for ecotourism (Brenner and Aguilar 2002; Clancy 2001; Pick et al. 2001; Zaragoza and Rojas 2000). Huatulco has chronically underperformed. Hotel occupancy rates average about 50% and drop sharply during the hot, dry season. Like Loreto, Huatulco’s struggles stem from geographic isolation, weak political support, and limited air service (Brenner 2010).
FONATUR’s five “growth pole” resorts have become Mexico’s primary destinations for international tourism. Over the past decade, these master-planned resorts have accounted for 81.1% of all foreign tourists visiting the country (SECTUR 2025; WTTC 2025). They have contributed significantly to federal revenue and helped generate millions of jobs in tourism and related sectors. Yet, despite their economic impact, these mega-resorts have largely failed to stimulate broader regional development or integrate meaningfully with surrounding areas (Ayala 1993; Casado 1997; Torres and Momsen 2005; Wilson 2008). Instead, they have fueled rapid urbanization and population growth that often outpaces public infrastructure and services. In 1995, in response to these persistent issues, President Ernesto Zedillo launched a new tourism development strategy aimed at addressing these shortcomings.
Mexico’s third generation of international tourist resorts exhibit considerable diversity, yet they share two things in common. First, they seek to build on the success of existing tourist destinations rather than starting from scratch. Second, they strive to extend their economic influence deeper into the hinterlands of each tourism “pole,” thereby reducing the isolation of resort enclaves, strengthening economic connectivity, and fostering greater integration with nearby rural areas. By focusing on developing tourism corridors (geographically connected routes linking multiple tourist destinations), the strategy promotes decentralized growth by extending the infrastructure to outlying areas thereby creating even more employment opportunities (Altés 2008; Torres 2007).
Some corridors have developed organically or with limited government support such as the Tijuana-Ensenada corridor in Baja California (Bringas-Rábago 2002). Others have been intentionally planned and executed by the federal government in collaboration with the Secretaría de Turismo and FONATUR. Examples include San Felipe-Santa Clara-Peñasco (Baja California and Sonora), Loreto-La Paz-Los Cabos (Baja California Sur), Chihuahua-Creel-El Fuerte (Chihuahua/Sinaloa), Cuernavaca-Tepoztlán-Atlixco-Cholula-Puebla (Morelos/Puebla), El Tajín-Veracruz-Los Tuxlas (Veracruz), San Cristobal-La Trinitaria (Chiapas), and Oaxaca-Teotitlán-Mitla (Oaxaca). However, the states of Quintana Roo, Baja California Sur, and Nayarit have seen the most investment and economic benefit from this model (Barrientos 2025; Brenner and Aguilar 2002; Bringas-Rábago 2002; Wilson 2008). To illustrate this approach, three case studies are presented: the Mayan Riviera, Litibú / Riviera Nayarit, and Escalera Náutica.
Mayan Riviera
In the early 1980s, Playa del Carmen was a sleepy coastal outpost with modest inns, rustic thatched huts, and a small boat dock. Its raison d’etre was a transit point for ferries traveling between the mainland and the island of Cozumel. In 1995, to ease pressure on Cancún, the Mexican government extended the tourism corridor southward along the Caribbean’s stunning emerald and turquoise coast. Their first step was upgrading Federal Highway 307. Fully completed in 2016, the 120-kilometer (75-mile) four-lane highway transformed Playa del Carmen into a thriving tourist destination and the primary commercial center of the Mayan Riviera.
Today, Playa del Carmen is densely packed with hotels, condominiums, and boutiques. As Highway 307 extended southward and access improved, luxury resorts pushed into the jungle, clearing land along the corridor. Most of these all-inclusive resorts remain mysterious to passersby because they are typically concealed behind gated entrances flanked by thick vegetation. Eco-parks and adventure centers offer nature tours, zip-lining, spelunking, and more. Likewise, ongoing archaeological excavations combined with government media campaigns promote elements of Mayan heritage that enable visitors to experience an authentic, “living culture” (Papanicolaou 2012).
The Mayan Riviera tourism corridor with its natural beauty, cultural richness, and coastal appeal has been widely viewed as a tremendous success. The number of tourist hotels and related services along the Caribbean coast of the Yucatán continues to grow. Each year, approximately four million international tourists visit the Mayan Riviera (SECTUR 2025). Although the boom in tourism has not translated into broad-based economic development or improved job security for many local residents (Manuel-Navarrete and Redclift 2012; Pi-Sunyer and Thomas 2015), Mexico considers the project a success. It has diverted growth and tourist flow southward along the Highway 307 corridor and taken pressure off Cancún.
Litibú / Riviera Nayarit
Since the late 1980s, rumors circulated about the Mexican government’s plans to build a luxury mega-resort north of Puerto Vallarta. While Puerto Vallarta remained a thriving and well-established destination, FONATUR envisioned a resort so exclusive it would draw global attention. In 2006, President Vicente Fox visited Playa Litibú and officially launched the project. Located five kilometers (three miles) north of Punta Mita, the 152-hectare (375-acre) complex was slated to include eight five-star hotels with over 3,200 rooms, hundreds of condominiums and villas, six commercial districts, a luxury shopping center, extensive green areas, and a Greg Norman golf course. It was the first phase of a broader plan promising more than 14,000 hotel rooms, three championship golf courses, private beach clubs, an amusement park, and a new marina.
Litibú faced significant challenges from the outset. The rugged Sierra Madre terrain complicated transportation and construction. Compounding the problem, Litibú lacks a reliable source of potable water. Officials proposed building a desalination plant, but the project never materialized (Zepeda Hernández and Costa de Carvalho 2017). These geographic constraints, coupled with the 2008 Great Recession, led President Felipe Calderón to scale back the project. While Litibú was eventually developed, it was on a far smaller scale than FONATUR originally envisioned.
Despite setbacks, neither the Mexican government nor the State of Nayarit abandoned their goal of creating a vibrant tourism corridor north of Puerto Vallarta. They improved roads, bridges, and utilities, and in 2007, began branding the area as “Riviera Nayarit” to attract new investment (Benavides Cortés 2015). Spanning roughly 300 kilometers from the Ameca River to Punta Mita and beyond, Riviera Nayarit was promoted as a destination offering everything from luxurious escapes for the rich and famous to small-town charm. Development has been most intense along the northern shore of Bahía de Banderas, with Puerto Vallarta International Airport serving as the primary gateway.
Today, Vidanta’s mega-resort in Nuevo Nayarit-Vallarta has effectively taken Litibú’s place. Founded in 1974, Grupo Vidanta (Mexico’s largest luxury resort developer) broke ground there in 2008 (Vidanta 2025). “Vidanta World” is remarkable in both ambition and scale. It features seven five-star hotels (each with a minimum of 500 rooms) alongside private villas, 40 restaurants and bars, 28 swimming pools, a gourmet supermarket, a Cirque du Soleil amusement park, and three PGA-caliber golf courses, all connected by a network of parkways, golf cart paths, and gondolas.
Beyond Vidanta, Riviera Nayarit is home to other luxury properties including the St. Regis, Ritz-Carlton, Naviva, and the Four Seasons at Punta Mita. Since its rebranding in 2007 the corridor has earned nicknames like the “Jewel of Mexico” and “Bali of Mexico” (Seligson 2024; Turon 2023). Riviera Nayarit has emerged as a richly layered destination offering a wide range of experiences. Overall, the Riviera Nayarit corridor has succeeded in extending the economic benefits of tourism beyond Puerto Vallarta. Tourism revenues have supported infrastructure improvements for local residents and ongoing efforts seek to balance growth with cultural preservation and community well-being (Seligson 2024).
Escalera Náutica
The idea for Escalera Náutica (Nautical Staircase) emerged in the 1970s from the same national study and computer analysis that led to the development of Cancún. FONATUR’s research identified the Sea of Cortez as a potential tourism hotspot (Brooke 2004; Pesenti and Dean 2003). In 2003, the government agency initiated Escalera Náutica. Modeled after the Spanish colonial missions along the Camino Real, the plan called for 24 full-service marinas spaced 120 nautical miles apart. Like a “pearl necklace” ringing the Gulf of California, each marina would accommodate superyachts and sailboats all supported by luxury hotels, top-tier golf courses, upscale shopping malls, and airstrips. Escalera Náutica was aimed squarely at the ultra-wealthy and expected to attract five million visitors and 75,000 yachts annually (Diehn 2003; Pesenti and Dean 2003).
The project was slated for completion in 2010, but it ran into serious headwinds. Environmentalists raised concerns about the region’s sensitive ecosystems and cited Mexico’s poor record of environmental oversight in tourism zones. At Santa Rosalía (the only marina completed) tidal action and prevailing currents continuously deposit sand into the bay, making it nearly impossible to keep the harbor navigable. Analysts also doubted demand, claiming FONATUR overestimated the boating market by as much as 600% (Taylor 2009). In response, the Fondo Mexicano para la Conservación de la Naturaleza, A.C. proposed a scaled-down version focused on areas with proven demand.
Social concerns added to the backlash. Critics warned the project would create few lasting jobs, erode traditional livelihoods, and possibly aid drug cartels by improving transportation infrastructure (Pesenti and Dean 2003). By 2008, under President Calderón, the project collapsed. His anti-corruption drive, war on cartels, and the global recession halted development. FONATUR ultimately accepted a reduced plan focused on a series of smaller corridors (Torres 2007). In 2017, FONATUR unexpectedly revived the project, but renewed criticism and the COVID-19 pandemic stalled progress again (González Barradas 2020; Mar 2017; STW 2025). Despite repeated failures, the project continues to linger in the government’s imagination.
As outlined above, the shift from centralized growth poles to tourism development corridors has produced mixed results. The Mayan Riviera is a clear success, effectively easing pressure on Cancún. Riviera Nayarit has shown strong potential, though its tourism corridor remains geographically limited. By comparison, Escalera Náutica (like Loreto) has been a complete failure. More broadly, the Mexican government has yet to implement a tourism strategy that is both socially inclusive and environmentally sustainable (Brenner and Aguilar 2002; Bringas-Rábago 2002; Camargo et al. 2014).
In many ways, 2007 marked a turning point for tourism in Mexico. Shortly after taking office, President Felipe Calderón began an aggressive campaign against drug cartels and committed to rooting out government corruption. His administration also initiated a significant shift in national tourism policy (Altés 2008; Ibáñez Pérez 2015). Acknowledging that earlier tourism development efforts had generated substantial profits for the government and private investors, Calderón’s administration admitted these projects had done little to improve the lives of everyday citizens, especially those living in remote, inland areas. Emphasizing this new direction, then-Secretary of Tourism Claudia Ruiz Massieu Salinas asserted that tourism in Mexico is about more than just beautiful beaches (Rodríguez 2023). Her statement signaled a renewed commitment to addressing the shortcomings of past initiatives. At the core of this new vision was a strong emphasis on promoting and investing in sustainable tourism (Barrientos 2025; UNESCO 2025).
Sustainable tourism refers to travel that minimizes environmental degradation and cultural disruption while maximizing benefits for host communities (Hammond 2025). In Mexico’s context, this includes respecting human rights, encouraging balanced development, diversifying tourist destinations, integrating tourism with other sectors of the regional economy, preserving natural and cultural heritage, as well as ensuring that tourism infrastructure serves both visitors and residents (Osorio-García and Novo 2020). Tourism becomes a tool for inclusion, equity, and ecological stewardship. Calderón’s approach was later reaffirmed by his successors. Enrique Peña Nieto expanded credit and branded tourism as a clean industry. Andrés Manuel López Obrador went a step further, pledging to make tourism a more effective vehicle for achieving social justice (Rodríguez 2023).
Mexico’s newest generation of tourist destinations is remarkably diverse. Many sites (including archaeological and cultural heritage) were identified decades ago but remained underdeveloped. It wasn’t until the mid-2000s, when the government began investing in their growth, that they began attracting international visitors. Despite their variety, most fall into two broad categories: environmental/ecological tourism and cultural/heritage tourism. Today, Mexico is home to more than 2,500 ecotourism sites (44 percent of them owned and operated by Indigenous communities) (Osorio-García and Novo 2020). The country also boasts 34 UNESCO World Heritage Sites and nine notable colonial cities, including Zacatecas, Guanajuato, and Oaxaca. Examples of sustainable tourism include the Monarch Butterfly Sanctuary and Día de los Muertos festivities near Lake Pátzcuaro in Michoacán. Previous studies in this journal have profiled El Vizcaíno Biosphere Reserve in Baja California Sur, where whale watching draws international visitors (Smith et al. 2019). In Chihuahua, Barrancas del Cobre (Copper Canyon) combines a dramatic landscape, the historic Chepe train, and Tarahumara cultural traditions to create a world-class experience (Smith 2008).
Since establishing its first biosphere reserve in 1977, Mexico has created 48 federally protected areas managed by the Comisión Nacional de Áreas Naturales Protegidas (CONANP). While the northern Yucatán Peninsula (Mayan Riviera) is heavily developed, the southern portion (stretching from Punta Herrero to the Belize border) remains largely untouched.
The Costa Maya region showcases sustainable tourism in practice. Government officials have taken deliberate steps to foster a more sustainable model in the south (Meyer-Arendt 2009). At the heart of this effort is the Sian Ka’an Biosphere Reserve, a federally protected area where local guides are encouraged to lead environmentally responsible excursions.
One of the newest additions to Mexico’s sustainable tourism map is La Huasteca, a region spanning San Luis Potosí, Tamaulipas, Veracruz, Hidalgo, and Querétaro. Known for its turquoise waterfalls, biodiversity, and adventure activities, La Huasteca is attracting both eco- and cultural tourists. With support from the Secretaría de Turismo, local guides have developed up to 16 full days of tourism experiences. One of the most distinctive experiences is Tapasoli (a boutique hotel near Xilitla with hobbit-style rooms inspired by The Lord of the Rings). The number of destinations in this new generation is too extensive to list. To illustrate the core principles of sustainable tourism in Mexico and highlight the character of these emerging destinations, two case studies are presented: Pueblos Mágicos and La Tren Maya.
Pueblos Mágicos
The Pueblos Mágicos (Magic Towns) program began in 2001 when Secretary of Tourism Leticia Navarro Ochoa selected three rural villages (Huasca de Ocampo, Real de Catorce, and Tepoztlán) for targeted tourism development. She believed communities across Mexico could draw visitors by showcasing their history, cultural traditions, and natural beauty. Over time, as administrations changed, the program’s goals and strategies became more clearly defined. By the late 2000s, federal officials saw Magic Towns as a way to stimulate local entrepreneurship and sustain employment (Balslev Clausen and Gyimóthy 2016; Osorio-García and Novo 2020). The initiative expanded rapidly. In 2015, 111 towns had been designated and by 2024 that number had increased to 177 (LugTur 2025) (see: Table 1).
These towns represent the rich diversity of Mexican culture and are often described as “the best of the best that Mexico has to offer” (Medina Ramírez 2021). Central to sustainable tourism is improving local quality of life while avoiding the environmental, social, and cultural degradation often linked to mass tourism (Barrientos 2025; Brenner 2010). The Pueblos Mágicos program fosters economic linkages with other sectors (especially agriculture and construction) and emphasizes community involvement. Anticipated benefits include growth of small- and medium-sized businesses, more diversified household income, improved infrastructure, enhanced name recognition, and the preservation of cultural heritage. However, research presents mixed findings, and it remains unclear how fully these outcomes have been achieved (Herrera-Prado et al. 2024; Rosas-Jaco et al. 2017; Uhnák 2018; Winiarczyk-Raźniak and Raźniak 2021).
La Tren Maya
The origins of La Tren Maya (the Mayan Train) trace back to 1988, when officials from Mexico, Guatemala, El Salvador, Belize, and Honduras met to discuss a 1,500-mile tourism corridor to promote and protect the Petén region’s shared cultural, historical, and environmental treasures. La Ruta Maya (the Mayan Route) was to be a multinational initiative aimed at creating a scenic byway from Cancún to Lake Atitlán connecting major archaeological sites such as Chichén Itzá, Uxmal, Palenque, Tikal, and Copán (Garrett 1989). It combined archaeological preservation with nature-based tourism. The National Geographic Society endorsed the idea in 1989, advocating for biosphere reserves and sustainable tourism blending ecotourism and cultural heritage. However, due to political and economic challenges, La Ruta Maya was never realized.
In its absence, the Mexican government adopted a unilateral strategy. To boost tourism in the Yucatán, officials began planning a domestic route through Quintana Roo, Yucatán, Campeche, Tabasco, and Chiapas. The project lingered in discussions for years, but it gained traction under President Andrés Manuel López Obrador, who saw the train as a way to redirect tourists inland and spark economic growth in one of Mexico’s poorest regions (Graham 2023; Pallares 2024; Rodríguez 2023). Construction began in June 2020 on a 1,550-kilometer (960-mile) rail loop, including a spur to Palenque. The first section (from Cancún to Campeche) opened in December 2023, five years ahead of schedule. However, as of July 2025, the full network of 34 stops remains unfinished.
The project has faced sharp criticism over its escalating costs, benefits, and environmental impacts. Originally budgeted at US$7.5 billion, costs have soared to around US$30 billion. High ticket prices (over US$2,100 for coach) suggest it targets affluent travelers. Supporters argue the project will create over one million jobs by 2030 and raise regional tourism revenue by at least 20 percent (Drillinger 2024; Graham 2023; Stevenson 2024). However, a 2019 United Nations Human Rights report noted a lack of local support, with many communities concerned about cultural disruption. Environmentalists warn that deforestation, habitat fragmentation, and threats to sensitive ecosystems (caves and cenotes) pose serious risks. Additional concerns include potential air and water pollution (de Miguel et al. 2024; Pallares 2024; Rodríguez 2023).
The examples discussed here reflect the diverse and evolving nature of Mexico’s fourth-generation tourism initiatives. While their outcomes vary, they represent the country’s most concerted efforts yet to engage communities and pursue sustainable tourism development (Osorio-García and Novo 2020).
Mexico’s rise as a global tourism powerhouse has been the subject of extensive research, most of which centers on analyzing the environmental and social impacts of large-scale tourism. Little attention has been given to how tourism in Mexico has evolved over time, or to categorizing the country’s vast and varied tourist landscape. This article has sought to fill that gap by tracing the historical trajectory of state-led tourism planning in Mexico.
Over the past 60 years, four overlapping generations of tourism development have emerged in Mexico. These eras are not distinct but instead blend into one another. Each new generation has been shaped by lessons learned from the past and efforts to correct the shortcomings of previous approaches. At the heart of this evolution lies the Mexican government’s ongoing challenge: how to stimulate national economic development through tourism while also improving the quality of life for everyday Mexican citizens.
Despite differences in approach, each generation of tourism planning has confronted a recurring set of challenges including uncontrolled growth, environmental degradation, infrastructure strain, social inequality, limited community participation, and economic enclaves with few local linkages. These persistent issues underscore a key lesson: large-scale, top-down tourism models that ignore environmental and social issues are largely unsustainable. As demand grows for eco- and cultural tourism, Mexico’s resorts must adapt to meet the expectations of increasingly discerning travelers. Flexibility in the face of globalization and shifting economic conditions is also critical.
Mexico offers a compelling case study for other developing nations navigating the complexities of international tourism. As one of the world’s premier destinations, the successes and setbacks Mexico has experienced carry valuable lessons for other countries seeking to build sustainable, inclusive, and competitive tourism sectors.